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Abstract
A focal point of macroeconomic policy analysis over the past
decade has been whether central banks should respond to changes
in asset prices. This thesis addresses the question from the distinct
perspective of equilibrium determinacy. By obtaining the conditions
for equilibrium determinacy, it is possible to ascertain whether a
central bank could induce additional volatility in an economy by
adopting a monetary policy rule which incorporates asset prices.
This thesis employs a New Keynesian model with a nancial
accelerator developed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)
to analyse the e¤ects on equilibrium determinacy. In contrast to
most of the related literature, the principal nding of this thesis is
that a central bank can respond to asset prices without inducing
additional volatility in the economy. Moreover, responding to asset
prices actually decreases the likelihood of indeterminacy. This can
be attributed to the substitutability between responding to ination
and asset prices present in a New Keynesian model with a nancial
accelerator. The key implication is that central banks should take
asset prices into account when designing monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
Large uctuations in asset prices have been observed in most
economies.1 Such episodes are normally characterised by a rapid
increase followed by a sharp decline in asset prices. Fluctuations in
asset prices, or, as they are sometimes called, bubbles,2 can have a
substantial impact on ination and output volatility.
It is against this backdrop that there is a long-standing debate
as to whether central banks should directly respond to movements in
asset prices. While there is a general consensus that the
objectives of monetary policy are to maintain low ination and to
limit the volatility of ination and output(Gruen, Plumb and Stone
2003, p.1), the point of contention is how to best accomplish these
objectives. Therefore, the question is whether by responding to
asset prices a central bank can better accomplish these objectives.
It is generally agreed that even though monetary policy alone is
insu¢ cient to contain the harm caused by large uctuations in asset
prices,3 it can have a substantial impact on asset prices. However,
the literature is divided over whether or not central banks should
respond to asset prices in an attempt to minimise the harm to the
macroeconomy.
1Recent notable examples include Australia, Japan, Finland, Norway, the United Kingdom
and the United States. Emerging economies have also experienced substantial uctuations in
asset prices, such as Mexico and several East Asian economies in the 1990s.
2Some of the literature discusses how an asset price bubble might be dened. One such
denition is that they are episodes where fundamental factors bring about an initial increase in
asset prices which is then magnied by subsequent speculative activity and the easy availability
of credit. See for example Simon (2003). For the purposes of this thesis, this denition is
adequate.
3Central banks can only a¤ect asset prices by adjusting the nominal interest rate.
Fluctuations in asset prices can be a¤ected by a number of other factors. For example,
scal policy, the legal system and regulation of the nancial sector.
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Most of the debate concerns whether asset prices belong in the
Taylor-type rules adopted by a large number of central banks.
Proponents of a policy rule that incorporates a measure of asset
prices have argued it will improve macroeconomic performance and
stability by reducing distortions in investment and consumption.
Conversely, critics have argued that reacting to asset prices over
and above what is necessary under exible ination targeting will
result in few, if any, additional gains. For example, Bernanke and
Gertler (1999) come to the opposite conclusion to Cecchetti et al.
(2000) on the desirability of responding to asset prices, despite the
fact that they adopt almost identical models (this will be discussed
in Section 2).
Given the considerable disagreement in the literature on whether
there are additional macroeconomic benets from responding to
asset prices, analysing the determinacy conditions is another
vantage point from which to assess the viability of such monetary
policy rules. Indeterminacy occurs when a monetary policy rule
is associated with very large sets of rational expectations equilibria
(Woodford 1999). By following a monetary policy rule which
responds to endogenous variables such as a Taylor-type rule, a
central bank can induce indeterminacy in an otherwise determinate
economy. The associated volatility in ination and output can lead
to substantial reductions in welfare.
The rationale for responding to asset prices is to improve
macroeconomic stability. If incorporating asset prices in a monetary
policy rule leads to additional volatility in ination and output, this
contradicts the underlying objective of responding to asset prices.
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In light of this, the contribution of this thesis is to analyse the con-
ditions for determinacy to ascertain whether central banks should
take into account asset prices when designing monetary policy.
Moreover, some empirical evidence indicates that monetary
volatility may be positively related to asset price volatility.4
Eichengreen and Tong (2003), for example, suggest that monetary
policy volatility in a number of countries during the 1970s and 1980s
may partly explain why stock markets have been more volatile in
recent decades. This suggests that central banks could be induc-
ing volatility in asset prices by following a policy rule associated
with indeterminacy. Such a possibility is another reason why it is
important to analyse equilibrium determinacy for a model which
incorporates asset prices.
The main nding of this thesis is that central banks should take
asset prices into account when designing monetary policy. By
responding to asset prices, a central bank can increase the
likelihood of determinacy because of the substitutability that exists
between responding to ination and asset prices. This substitutabil-
ity is attributable to the nancial accelerator e¤ect5 present in the
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) model.
4Eichengreen and Tong (2003) use volatility in equity prices as a proxy for general asset
price volatility in 12 countries to examine the relationship between asset market volatility
and possible determinants of such volatility. The most promising determinant they nd is
monetary volatility, which they nd to be positively related to asset price volatility in almost
every country studied.
5The nancial accelerator is explained in Section 3. Essentially it works as follows. When
asset prices increase, this increases the value of entrepreneursnet worth. An increase in net
worth then reduces the premium for external nance in the next period which implies an
increase investment. An increase in investment then causes asset prices to increase again in
the next period and the process repeats itself.
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In addition, it is found that allowing for an asset price bubble
where changes in asset prices can be driven by non-fundamentals has
no qualitative or quantitative impact on equilibrium
determinacy. This can be explained by the way asset price
bubbles have been incorporated into most models in the litera-
ture (in particular Bernanke and Gertler 1999) whereby a bubble is
assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 2
evaluates the recent related literature on equilibrium
determinacy as well as some of the literature which conducts policy
simulations. Section 3 presents a variant of the Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999) model used to calculate the determinacy of
equilibrium. Section 4 is devoted to the ndings of this thesis
and analyses the di¤erent determinacy regions under alternative
monetary policy rules and models. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Recent related literature
There is extensive literature devoted to the question of whether
central banks should respond to asset prices. The majority of papers
on the subject have compared the e¤ects on real activity when a cen-
tral bank adopts a more traditional monetary policy rule with those
when a central bank responds to asset prices by simulating a macro-
economic model which incorporates asset price uctuations. The
general consensus (although there are some prominent dissenters)
is that central banks should not respond to changes in asset prices
unless their movements signal a change in expected ination.
In the limited research on determinacy when asset prices are
included in the policy rule, the conclusion has also been that central
banks should not respond to asset prices. However, to the authors
knowledge there has been no analysis of equilibrium determinacy for
the kinds of models used in the policy simulation literature where
uctuations in asset prices propagate and amplify shocks to the
macroeconomy.
This section rst considers literature which addresses whether
central banks should respond to asset prices from a policy simulation
perspective. This is followed by a discussion of the literature which
addresses the question from a determinacy perspective.
2.1 Policy simulations
The majority of research which addresses the question of whether
central banks should respond to asset prices compares the e¤ects on
real activity when a central bank adopts a more traditional monetary
policy rule with those when a central bank responds to asset prices.
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Two of the most prominent papers on the subject are Bernanke and
Gertler (1999) and Cecchetti et al. (2000).
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that monetary policy should
only respond to changes in asset prices when this signals a change
in expected ination. To reach this conclusion they use a modied
version of the nancial accelerator model developed by Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) which allows for exogenous bubbles
in asset prices. More specically, they develop a process for an
asset price bubble which captures the speculative swings of stock
markets.6 The model is simulated for a number of di¤erent scenarios
including di¤erent monetary policy rules and sources of stock price
bubbles.
There are two key results in the paper which suggest that
central banks should not respond to changes in asset prices. First,
it is found that in the event of a stock price bubble, if an ination-
accommodating7 central bank responds to stock prices, the
publics expectation that the central bank will increase interest rates
in response to the bubble pushes fundamental stock prices down and
output and ination also both fall.8 There is also a large increase in
ination variability.
The second key result is that if a central bank responds to
uctuations in asset prices arising from a mixture of fundamen-
tal and non-fundamental sources, it prevents output from rising by
the amount of the increase in potential output. Essentially, such a
6The details of the model are provided in Section 4.5.
7Dened as when a central bank responds to a one percentage point increase in expected
ination by raising the nominal interest rate by 1.01 percentage points.
8 In the case of an aggressive ination targeting central bank (dened as when a central
bank responds to a one percentage point increase in expected ination by raising the nominal
interest rate by 2.0 percentage points), the authors nd that the outcome does not di¤er
greatly from when such a central bank responds only to ination.
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policy response temporarily sties the positive impact of the in-
crease in asset prices caused by fundamental sources. This result
illuminates one of the key points of contention in the literature,
that is, whether central banks can determine the source of a shock
and whether or not it is fundamental.
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) propose that by focusing on the
traditional goals of monetary policy a central bank can respond
e¤ectively without having to decide what is fundamental and what
is not. However, whether this is a compelling reason not to directly
respond to asset price bubbles is contentious. It has often been
pointed out that central banks are charged with the di¢ cult task
of forecasting and estimating many variables. Moreover, some cen-
tral banks respond to the output gap even though it is di¢ cult to
estimate.
Cecchetti et al. (2000) are well known proponents of a monetary
policy rule which incorporates a response to asset prices. Cecchetti
et al. (2000) use an almost identical model to that adopted by
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) to contend their results. By
assuming policy-makers seek to minimise a loss function (a weighted
sum of ination and output variability), the authors conclude that
in the majority of cases central banks should respond to stock price
bubbles because the loss function can be reduced by doing so. In
comparing their optimal monetary policy rules with the policy rules
recommended in Bernanke and Gertler (1999), they nd that,
regardless of the relative weights of ination and output variability
in the loss function, their rules are superior in terms of minimising
loss.
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The question is how Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Cecchetti
et al. (2000) obtain such di¤erent results using very similar models.
The main reason is that the basic assumptions of their models are
di¤erent. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) remove the output gap from
the monetary policy rule when conducting their simulations, which
Cecchetti et al. (2000) argue merely demonstrates that reacting to
stock prices instead of the output gap results in an inferior economic
performance. Interestingly, Cecchetti et al. (2000) nd that after
adding the output gap, the perverse impact of the bubble when a
central bank is ination-accommodating is completely eliminated.
Instead, output rises modestly and ination falls only modestly.
However, as Bernanke and Gertler (2001) point out in a
subsequent paper, Cecchetti et al. (2000) do not take into account
the probabilistic nature of the bubble but rather consider the sin-
gle scenario of a bubble lasting ve periods. In contrast, Bernanke
and Gertler (2001) optimise the policy rule by considering an entire
probability distribution of shocks, including shocks other than those
caused by a bubble. Therefore, Bernanke and Gertler (2001) argue
that the method in Cecchetti et al. (2000) will only yield an optimal
policy if a central bank knows that stock prices are being driven by
non-fundamentals and knows when it will burst.
Most central banks have adopted a similar position to Bernanke
and Gertler (1999; 2001). However, given the considerable
disagreement in the literature on whether there are additional macro-
economic benets from responding to asset price bubbles, analysing
the determinacy conditions is another vantage point from which to
assess the viability of such monetary policy rules.
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2.2 Determinacy of equilibrium
The literature on equilibrium determinacy in dynamic general equi-
librium models dates back to the 1980s. Indeterminacy occurs when
a monetary policy rule is associated with very large sets of
rational expectations equilibria (Woodford 1999). A monetary
policy rule which induces indeterminacy is undesirable because if
a central bank adopts this rule the system might be unexpect-
edly volatile as agents are unable to coordinate on a particular
equilibrium among the many that exist(Bullard and Mitra 2002,
p.1106). By contrast, it is assumed that agents can coordinate on a
determinate equilibrium.
There are two papers which analyse the determinacy conditions
for when a central bank responds to asset prices. Both Bullard and
Shaling (2002) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) obtain results which
suggest that central banks can inadvertently induce indeterminacy
in the economy by responding to asset prices.
Bullard and Schaling (2002) use the simple and small
macroeconomic system adopted by Bullard and Mitra (2002) to an-
alytically solve for the determinacy conditions when a central bank
responds to the percentage deviation of the general level of equity
prices from the long-run equilibrium level in a contemporaneous
monetary policy rule (Bullard and Schaling 2002, p.38). They nd
that for a strong enough response to deviations in asset prices, a
central bank could cause real damage to the economy.
The way equity prices are incorporated into the model is essential
to the conclusion reached in Bullard and Schaling (2002). Using
the inverse relationship between the price of a share of aggregate
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equity and the gross nominal interest rate on a one period bond,
they are able to put the equity price term in the policy rule in
terms of deviations in the gross nominal interest rate. The result
is that the weights given to ination and the output gap in the
policy rule are also inuenced by the weight given to the coe¢ cient
on equity price deviations. The more weight placed on the equity
price coe¢ cient, the lower the weights on the ination and output
gap coe¢ cients. In fact, as more and more weight is placed on the
equity price coe¢ cient, the ination and output gap coe¢ cients are
driven to zero while the model specication in Bullard and Mitra
(2002) remains una¤ected.
The contribution made by Bullard and Schaling (2002) is an
analysis of equilibrium determinacy when a central bank responds to
asset prices for a simple and small macroeconomic model. However,
their model incorporates asset prices in an ad hoc fashion and does
not include credit market frictions which induce the nancial accel-
erator e¤ect present in the model developed by Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999). The nancial accelerator allows endogenous
developments in credit markets to amplify and propagate shocks to
the macroeconomy(Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1999, p.1342).
Therefore, the result in Bullard and Schaling (2002) does not
capture the e¤ects changes in asset prices can have on the macro-
economy and the associated e¤ect this could have on equilibrium
determinacy. This thesis builds on their analysis by examining the
determinacy conditions for the more complex nancial accelerator
model in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). The foundations
of the model and the mechanics of the nancial accelerator are
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explained in detail in Section 3.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) also conclude that a central bank
should not respond to asset prices on the basis that it could induce
indeterminacy. Their paper focuses on the prot mechanism as a
particular source of indeterminacy. The nominal interest rate in
their model responds to log deviations in the share price (and no
other asset prices) which is important in determining their results.
Their key nding is that in a model with sticky prices a central bank
that responds to share prices indirectly responds to rm prots.
This is because an increase in ination tends to lower rm prots
such that when the central bank responds to share prices its overall
response to ination is weaker. This has the e¤ect of increasing the
likelihood of indeterminacy. Therefore, the larger the negative e¤ect
of ination on prots, the more likely there will be indeterminacy
of equilibrium when a central bank responds to share prices.
However, as in Bullard and Schaling (2002), there is no nancial
accelerator mechanism present in the model. Moreover, the mon-
etary policy rule studied by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) assumes
the central bank only responds to ination and log deviations of the
share price (and thus omitting the output gap). The contribution
of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) is to highlight one particular novel
source of indeterminacy. In doing so, the authors do not account
for some of the other e¤ects changes in asset prices can have on
the macroeconomy. Additionally, because they omit the output gap
from the monetary policy rule, there is no analysis of the interaction
between the output gap, ination and asset price terms in the policy
rule in relation to equilibrium determinacy.
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Both Bullard and Schaling (2002) and Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2007) have examined the impact on equilibrium determinacy when
a central bank responds to asset prices in a Taylor-type monetary
policy rule. However, to date there has been no analysis of the
implications for determinacy when a central bank responds to
asset prices in a model which allows uctuations in asset prices to
propagate and amplify shocks to the macroeconomy. This thesis
incorporates asset prices in a careful fashion as well as the nancial
accelerator in order to analyse the e¤ect on equilibrium determinacy
when a central bank responds to asset prices.
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3 Model
This thesis employs the model developed by Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999). It is a standard New Keynesian model with one
distinguishing feature: it incorporates credit market frictions, giv-
ing rise to a nancial accelerator e¤ect. While the model is not
the contribution of this thesis, it is presented in this section for
completeness. The model presented here is modied in a way that
makes notation and timing consistent with Bernanke and Gertler
(1999). This makes the determinacy conditions for the two models
comparable (see Section 4).
This section introduces the agents in the model and the
associated optimality conditions. The linearised equations are then
provided followed by the dynamic system used to calculate
equilibrium determinacy.
3.1 A New Keynesian model with a nancial accelerator
The distinguishing feature of the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999) model is the existence of credit market frictions, giving rise
to a nancial accelerator e¤ect. Apart from this addition, the model
follows a standard dynamic New Keynesian framework. New
Keynesian models are widely used for understanding the relationship
between monetary policy, ination and the business cycle. They
have two key features: imperfect competition in the goods mar-
ket and some constraint on the price adjustment mechanism. The
constraint on price adjustment is normally staggered price setting
introduced by Calvo (1983).
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By adding a nancial accelerator to the standard New Keynesian
model, credit market frictions can a¤ect the real economy. There
are numerous examples of the conditions in banking systems feeding
back into the real economy. Countries or regions where distressed
banking systems have contributed to substantial contractions in
the macroeconomy include the United States, Scandinavia, Latin
America, Japan and other East Asian countries (Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist 1999). The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 is
the most recent example. Deteriorating credit conditions were not
merely the product of a declining real economy but were arguably
the major factor depressing economic activity.
The model assumes only fundamental factors a¤ect asset prices
and uctuations in asset prices are caused by the nancial
accelerator e¤ect. This is consistent with literature where asset price
bubbles are characterised as episodes where fundamental
factors bring about an initial increase in asset prices which is then
magnied by subsequent speculative activity and the easy
availability of credit.9 One extreme example of uctuations in
asset prices is a bubble where changes in asset prices are driven
by non-fundamentals.
There are three types of agents in the model: households,
entrepreneurs and retailers. Households supply labour, consume
goods and services, invest their savings (for which they receive a
riskless rate of return) and hold money. Entrepreneurs play a key
role in the model. They produce output using labour and capital and
sell the output to retailers. Capital investment is nanced by the
entrepreneursown funds or by borrowing. Entrepreneurs survive
9For example, see Simon (2003).
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with probability  . The entrepreneurs that do not survive make a
small transfer to new entrepreneurs (which is a technical assump-
tion so that entrepreneurs start o¤ with some net worth) and then
consume the rest. Retailers purchase wholesale goods from en-
trepreneurs, di¤erentiate them costlessly and then sell them in a
monopolistically competitive retail market. Not all retailers can
change their prices every period in accordance with staggered price
setting from Calvo (1983). The model also includes a government
which conducts scal and monetary policy.
3.1.1 Household sector
Households are innitely lived and maximise the expected present
discounted value of utility dened over consumption, real money
holdings and leisure:
Et
1X
k=0
k

ln(Ct+k) +  ln

Mt+k
Pt+k

+ 
(1  Lt+k)1 ( 1)
1  (  1)

(3.1)
where  > 0,  > 0 are elasticities of substitution, 0 <  < 1 is the
discount factor and (  1) is the elasticity of labour supply.
Households maximise utility subject to the budget constraint:
Ct +Dt +

Mt
Pt

=WtLt   Tt +t +Rt 1Dt 1 +

Mt 1
Pt

(3.2)
Therefore, households choose consumption (Ct), deposits held
at nancial intermediaries (Dt), leisure (1   Lt), and money bal-
ances (Mt=Pt) to maximise utility subject to their budget constraint
(3.2). The consumers budget constraint requires that consumption,
savings and money holdings equal after tax (Tt) income. Household
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income comprises real wage earnings (WtLt), dividends from private
sector ownership (t), the return to savings deposits held at nancial
intermediaries (Rt 1Dt 1) and real money balances from the previ-
ous period (Mt 1=Pt). The solution to the households problem is
given by the following optimality conditions:
1
Ct
= Et


1
Ct+1

Rt (3.3)
Wt:
1
Ct
= 
1
(1  Lt) 1 (3.4)
Mt
Pt
= Ct

Rnt   1
Rnt
 1
(3.5)
Equation 3.3. is the Euler equation for optimal intertemporal
allocation of consumption. According to equation 3.4 the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure must equal
the real wage. Equation 3.5 is the intratemporal condition requiring
that the substitution between money and consumption equal the
opportunity cost of holding money where Rnt = Rt
Pt+1
Pt
is the gross
nominal interest rate.
3.1.2 Entrepreneurial sector
Entrepreneurs produce wholesale goods using physical capital and
labour. They maximise prots:
Et
1X
k=0
t;k(Yt+k  Rkt+kKt+k  Wt+kLt+k) (3.6)
given by the aggregate output (Yt+k) minus the cost of
capital (Rkt+kKt+k) and labour (Wt+kLt+k).
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The discount factor t;k is kCt=Ct+k.
Entrepreneurs maximise prots subject to the following
technology:
Yt = ZtK

t L
1 
t (3.7)
where 0 <  < 1. Yt is the aggregate output of wholesale goods,
Zt is an exogenous technology parameter, Kt is aggregate capital
purchased by entrepreneurs in the previous period (t   1) and Lt is
aggregate labour.
The solution to the entrepreneurs problem yields the following
optimality conditions:
Rkt = 
Yt
Kt
MCt (3.8)
Wt = (1  )Yt
Lt
MCt (3.9)
where the real marginal cost of production (MCt) is the Lagrangian
multiplier for the period t. Equations 3.8 and 3.9 equate the
marginal product of an input to its rental rate.
Entrepreneurs purchases of physical capital are nanced by
entrepreneurial wealth10(hereinafter referred to as net worth) and
borrowing. Entrepreneurial borrowing plays the key role here
because of the nancial accelerator e¤ect.
The evolution of capital stock is given by:
Kt+1 = 

It
Kt

Kt + (1  )Kt (3.10)
where 0 <  < 1 is the depreciation rate and the function (It=Kt)Kt
10Wealth equals liquid assets plus collateral value of illiquid assets less outstanding obliga-
tions.
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captures the increasing marginal adjustment costs in the production
of capital such that 0() > 0, 00() < 0 and (0) = 0: This is required
for capital to have a variable price. The expected price of a unit of
capital (EtQt+1) is then given by:
EtQt+1 =

0

EtIt+1
Kt+1
 1
(3.11)
where capital producers have to make their investment decisions
one period in advance.
Using equation 3.8, the interest rate on external funds, Rqt is given
by:
Rqt =
Rkt +Qt(1  )
Qt 1
(3.12)
and depends on the rent and price of a unit of capital.
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) assume that there is a
costly state verication (CSV) problem. This is a source of
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders which then
results in a premium for external nance.11 CSV makes it neces-
sary for lenders to pay a xed auditing costwhich is essentially a
cost paid to observe an individual borrowers realised return (which
would otherwise be unknown to the lender while the borrower can
observe this at no cost).
Because the return to capital is sensitive to both aggregate and
idiosyncratic risk, the ex post gross return on capital for a partic-
ular rm is also subject to an idiosyncratic shock. For a certain
11The di¤erence between the cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of
funds internal to the rm.
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threshold value of idiosyncratic shock, an entrepreneur will be un-
able to repay the loan at the agreed contractual rate and thus de-
faults. The lending intermediary then has to pay the auditing cost
and retains anything else that remains.
Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral here and care only about the mean
return on wealth. Therefore, they bear all the aggregate risk which
means guaranteeing the lender a return equal to the value of the risk-
less rate. Lenders then bear the residual risk arising from
idiosyncratic shocks (which is diversiable). When there is a rise
in the expected discounted return to capital (and as a result the
threshold value of idiosyncratic shock falls), entrepreneurs benet
from a lower probability of default, and as a result can take on more
debt.
Therefore, this yields the following supply curve for investment
nance:
EtR
q
t+1 = s

Nt
QtKt+1

Rt (3.13)
where the function s() determines the cost of external nance
(EtRqt+1) relative to the cost of internal nance (Rt). Nt is the
entrepreneurs net worth and QtKt+1 is total borrowings.
Therefore, the ratio Nt=QtKt+1 represents the nancial condition of
entrepreneurs. The cost of external nance relative to the cost of in-
ternal nance is decreasing in the nancial condition of
entrepreneurs, s0() < 0 and s(1) = 1:Equation 3.13 is the key equation
for the nancial accelerator in the model.
Finally, the model assumes that entrepreneurs survive with
probability  . New entrepreneurs (1   ) enter to replace exiting
entrepreneurs. Exiting entrepreneurs make a small transfer to the
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new entrepreneurs and then consume what remains.12
3.1.3 Retail sector
Retailers purchase wholesale goods from entrepreneurs at their
nominal marginal cost and then di¤erentiate them costlessly. These
di¤erentiated goods are then sold by retailers in a monopolistically
competitive retail market. In accordance with staggered price set-
ting from Calvo (1983), not all retailers are able to adjust their
prices in the current period. The probability that a retailer changes
their prices in period t is given by 1 . Therefore, retailer z chooses
his or her price, pt(z), to maximise expected discounted prots:
Et
1X
k=0
kt;k

pt(z)
Pt+k
Yt+k(z) MCt+kYt+k(z)

(3.14)
where the discount factor t;k is kCt=Ct+k. Yt+k(z) is the demand
for retail goods at this price. k is the probability that the nominal
price is xed in period k and Pt+k is the aggregate price.
Retailers maximise expected discounted prots subject to:
Yt(z) =

pt(z)
Pt
 
Yt (3.15)
The rst order condition for retailers is then given by:
pt
Pt
=

  1
Et
P1
k=0 
kkYt+kMCt+k

Pt+k
Pt

Et
P1
k=0 
kkYt+k

Pt+k
Pt
 1 (3.16)
12The transfer to new entrepreneurs ensures that they start of with some net worth so
they can begin operations. This assumption is inferred from the Bernanke and Gertler (1999)
model; whereas Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) assume that entrepreneurs supplement
their income by working in the general labour market. Neither of these assumptions have
signicant e¤ects on the results.
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and pt is the optimal price set by all retailers able to adjust prices
at time t.
The aggregate price in period t is given by:
Pt = [P
1 
t 1 + (1  )p1 t ]
1
1  (3.17)
By approximating (3.16) and (3.17) around a zero average
ination, steady state equilibrium, we can obtain the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve which provides the source of nominal price
stickiness in the model:
t = mct + Ett+1 (3.18)
where  = (1 )(1 )(1 ) .
3.1.4 Government sector
The government conducts scal and monetary policy. The
government nances expenditure by lump sum taxes and money
creation:
Gt =
Mt  Mt 1
Pt
+ Tt (3.19)
Gt follows a rst order autoregressive process such that:
log(Gt) = g log(Gt 1) + "
g
t (3.20)
where 0  g < 1 and "gt  N(0; 2g) is a serially uncorrelated random
shock.
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The central bank follows the monetary policy rule:
log

Rnt
Rn

=  log
t


+ y log

Yt
Y

+ q log

Qt
Q

(3.21)
where the nominal interest rate responds to the log levels of in-
ation (t), output (Yt) and asset prices (Qt) relative to their steady
state values (represented by variables with no time scripts). The
coe¢ cients on ination, output and asset price deviations are given
by   0; y  0 and q  0 respectively.
The monetary policy rule has been modied to allow the central
bank to respond to asset prices. The coe¢ cient on asset prices q
determines by how many percentage points a central bank responds
to a one per cent increase in asset prices (relative to the steady state
value).
3.2 Linearised equations
Following Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), the model can be
linearised around the steady state. Let lower case variables denote
percentage deviations from the steady state and variables without
time scripts denote steady state values, the linearised equations of
the model are:
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Aggregate demand
yt =
C
Y
ct +
Ce
Y
cet +
I
Y
it +
G
Y
gt (3.22)
ct =  rt + Etct+1 (3.23)
cet = qt + kt+1 (3.24)
rqt = (1  #)(mct + yt   kt) + #qt   qt 1 (3.25)
Etr
q
t+1 = rt    (nt   qt   kt+1) (3.26)
Etqt+1 = '(Etit+1   kt+1) (3.27)
Aggregate supply
yt = zt + kt + (1  )lt (3.28)
yt   lt +mct   ct = (  1)lt (3.29)
t = mct + Ett+1 (3.30)
Evolution of state variables
kt+1 = it + (1  )kt (3.31)
nt = R
q[
K
N
(rqt   Et 1rqt ) +
(1  Rk)

yt + nt 1) (3.32)
Shock processes
gt = ggt 1 + "
g
t (3.33)
zt = zzt 1 + "
z
t (3.34)
Monetary policy rule
rnt = t + yyt + qqt (3.35)
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The intertemporal ISequation (3.23), New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (3.30) and contemporaneous monetary policy rule (3.35) are
all standard equations used in the literature on determinacy. The
monetary policy rule has been modied to allow the nominal interest
rate to move in response to changes in asset prices.
The additional linearised equations are from the Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999) model and have been included for the purposes
of analysing determinacy when there are credit market frictions.
In the aggregate demand block, equation 3.22 is the economy-
wide resource constraint which now also includes entrepreneurial
consumption, cet . Entrepreneurial consumption changes in
proportion to changes in asset prices and capital (3.24). Equation
3.25 is the fundamental return on assets which is given by the sum
of the current return to assets [(1 #)(mct+ yt  kt)] and any increase
in the fundamental value of assets [#qt   qt 1]. This is obtained by
log linearising equation 3.12 where # = (1  )=(MC YK + 1  ).
Equation 3.26 embeds the nancial accelerator from the supply
curve for investment nance given by equation 3.13. It captures
the inuence of net worth on investment. Due to capital market
frictions, the cost of external funds depends on entrepreneursnet
worth relative to the gross value of capital [nt  (qt+ kt+1)]. The cost
of external funds decreases as this ratio increases, implying that
investment will rise as a result. The parameter  is the elasticity
of the external nance premium to leverage. Equation 3.27 then
captures the e¤ect of expected investment relative to capital on the
expected value of asset prices. This is obtained by log-linearising
equation 3.11 where ' = [(I=K) 1]0=[(I=K) 1]00.
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In the aggregate supply block, equation 3.28 is the linearised pro-
duction function from equation 3.7. Equation 3.29 gives the labour
market equilibrium condition obtained by setting labour
supply equal to labour demand from equations 3.4 and 3.9 respec-
tively. The standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve derived from
staggered price setting in retail sector (as discussed in section 3.1.3)
is given as equation 3.30.
The evolution of capital and net worth are given by equations 3.31
and 3.32 respectively. The evolution of capital comes from equation
3.10. Entrepreneurial net worth depends mostly on the net return
on assets (the rst term) and the lagged value of net worth (the
last term). The remaining term represents the transfer from exiting
entrepreneurs where  is the probability of survival.
Finally, equations 3.33 and 3.34 are the exogenous disturbances
to government consumption and technology which follow stationary
autoregressive processes.
The way the nancial accelerator operates is clear from the lin-
earised equations. When asset prices increase, this increases the
value of entrepreneursnet worth (equation 3.32). An increase in
net worth then reduces the premium for external nance in the next
period (equation 3.26) which implies an increase investment. An
increase in investment then causes asset prices to increase again in
the next period (equation 3.27) and the process repeats itself.
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3.3 The dynamic system
Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Honkapohja and Mitra
(2004) and Bullard and Singh (2007), the dynamic system can be
written as:
B11Pt = B12EtPt+1 +B13Xt (3.36)
Xt = RPt 1 + SXt 1 + Ut (3.37)
Where Pt = [ct; it; t; rqt ; qt] is a vector of free variables,
Xt = [kt; nt 1; gt; zt; qt 1; Et 1r
q
t ] is a vector of predetermined variables,
Ut = [0; 0; "
g
t ; "
z
t ; 0; 0] is a vector of fundamental disturbances and R and
S are conformable matrices.
The matrices can then be redened such that:
Pt = B1EtPt+1 + CXt (3.38)
Xt = RPt 1 + SXt 1 + Ut (3.39)
where B1 = (B11) 1B12 and C = (B11) 1B13.
Letting t+1 = Pt+1  EtPt+1, the system can then be rewritten as:
Pt = B1Pt+1 + CXt  B1t+1 (3.40)
Xt+1 = RPt + SXt + Ut+1 (3.41)
The dynamic system is then written as a vector autoregressive
process:
D1
264 Pt
Xt
375 = D2
264 Pt+1
Xt+1
375+ E
264 Ut+1
t+1
375 (3.42)
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where
D1 =
264 I  C
R S
375 (3.43)
D2 =
264 B1 0
0 I
375 (3.44)
E =
264 0  B1
 I 0
375 (3.45)
The Schur Decomposition is then used nd the eigenvalues for
the system.13 The eigenvalues are obtained from the decomposition
of D1 and D2. Further details are provided in Appendix A. Fol-
lowing Blanchard and Kahn (1980), for determinacy there must be
at least as many eigenvalues inside the unit circle as there are free
variables.14 If the number of eigenvalues inside the unit circle is less
than the number of free variables in the system, the equilibrium will
be indeterminate.
The determinacy regions for the monetary policy coe¢ cients on
ination deviations (); the output gap (y) and asset price
deviations (q) are obtained using numerical calculations15 since it
is di¢ cult to obtain an analytical solution for such a large system.
13Because D1 is singular the Jordan Decomposition method from Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) cannot be used to obtain the eigenvalues for this particular system.
14Note that in this system it is the number of eigenvalues inside the unit circle because the
system is ordered di¤erently from Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
15Code available on request.
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4 Determinacy of equilibrium
This section rst computes the determinacy region for a New
Keynesian model with a nancial accelerator where the central bank
does not respond to asset prices. It then studies how equilibrium
determinacy is impacted when the central bank responds to asset
prices.
4.1 Calibrated values
Calibrated values for simulating the determinacy region have been
selected from Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Bernanke
and Gertler (1999). They are:  = 1:0;  = 0:99;  = 0:025;  = 0:33;
 = 0:086;  = 1:33;  = 0:95; ' = 0:25; g = 0:95; z = 1:0 and # = 0:32.16
These are all fairly standard values in the literature. While the
non-standard parameter values reect the interplay between real
and nancial factors within the entrepreneurial sector(Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist 1999, p.1368). The elasticity of the external
nance premium to leverage is given by  = 0:05 and the steady
state risk spread is assumed to be given by Rq = 2 + Rn, implying
the risk spread is equal to approximately two percentage points. It
will become apparent in the results that follow that the risk spread
and the value of  in particular are pivotal for determinacy because
they a¤ect the external nance premium and the magnitude of the
nancial accelerator e¤ect respectively. The steady state values are:
G
Y = 0:2;
N
K = 0:5;
Ce
Y = 0:04.
16Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchirst (1999) and Bernanke and Gertler (1999) do not specify
a value for #. However, # = (1 )
MC Y
K
+1  where MC =
 1

. Using  = 6 (to yield a fairly
standard value for steady state marginal cost of approximately 0.83) we can obtain # = 0:32:
31
4.2 A New Keynesian model with a nancial accelerator
This thesis rst explores how introducing a nancial accelerator in
a standard New Keynesian model changes the determinacy region.
Here the central bank does not react to asset prices.
A model with a nancial accelerator is compared with a model
without a nancial accelerator. The determinacy region for the
contemporaneous monetary policy rule in Bullard and Mitra (2002)
is used as the benchmark with no nancial accelerator. The rele-
vant parameter values from Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)
have been substituted for those in Bullard and Mitra (2002)17 for
the purpose of comparison.
fp
fy
Figure 1: Determinacy region adapted
from Bullard and Mitra (2002)
fp
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Figure 2: Determinacy region with the
nancial accelerator and q = 0
Figure 1 is the determinacy region from Bullard and Mitra (2002)
for a simple and small forward-looking macroeconomic model. The
model comprises an intertemporal IS equation, the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve and a monetary policy rule which responds
17 In Bullard and Mitra (2002)  = 0:157 and  = 0:024. These have been changed to  = 1
and  = 0:086 to stay consistent with Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
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to ination deviations and the output gap. There is no capital,
entrepreneurial consumption or nancial accelerator present in the
model.
The shaded regions give the policy rules associated with deter-
minacy of equilibrium. From Figure 1 if the nominal interest rate
responds to ination deviations more than one-for-one such that
 > 1, this will be su¢ cient for determinacy. This is consistent
with the Taylor principle.18 If  < 1, there needs to be a stronger
response to the output gap to avoid indeterminacy.
If the equilibrium is indeterminate (any point in the non-shaded
region), the economy could be unexpectedly volatile if agents are un-
able to coordinate on one particular equilibrium given the existence
of a large set of equally possible equilibria. Moreover, this large
set could include equilibria in which endogenous variables respond
to random events unrelated to economic fundamentals (Woodford
2003).
Consider a simple case when  < 1 and y = 0. Suppose there is
an increase in expected ination: that is, for some reason consumers
expect that prices are going to increase. All other things being equal,
this higher expected ination will lead to a lower real interest rate
because the nominal interest rate has not increased enough. This
lower real interest rate will stimulate aggregate demand and fuel
ination. Therefore, such an expectation generates higher ination
and gives way to a self-fullling ination spiral (Woodford 2001).
However, if the central bank responds aggressively enough to ina-
tion deviations, the resulting increase in the real interest rate will
18A broad interpretation of the Taylor principle is that a good monetary policy rule is one
where the nominal interest rate responds to ination more than one-for-one.
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curb ination and e¤ectively prevent the occurrence of self-fulling
expectations.
At the bounds for which the system becomes indeterminate, to
achieve determinacy the central bank needs to compensate for a re-
duction in one of the monetary policy coe¢ cients with a su¢ cient
increase in the other coe¢ cient. This can be described as a type
of trade-o¤ between responding to ination deviations and the out-
put gap once the monetary policy rule approaches the boundary of
the determinacy region. For example, the trade-o¤ exists such that
a central bank needs to substitute a weaker response to ination
deviations with a stronger response to the output gap in order to
induce determinacy. Therefore, even if  < 1, a central bank can
still induce determinacy if it responds strongly enough to the output
gap. The trade-o¤ is not one-for-one due to the long term relation-
ship between ination deviations and the output gap implied by the
New Keynesian Phillips Curve.19 The determinacy region will also
be a¤ected by the degree of price stickiness.20
Figure 2 is the determinacy region when there is a nancial ac-
celerator present and no response to asset prices such that q = 0.
19According to the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, each percentage point of permanently
higher ination implies a permanently higher output gap of more than one per cent. Therefore,
if one considers the interest rate rule purely in terms of a change in ination, the coe¢ cient
on the output gap will need to be larger to have the same e¤ect on the nominal interest rate
as responding to ination.
20The value of  from the Phillips Curve, which is a¤ected by the degree of price stickiness,
has a signicant impact on the determinacy region. A higher value of  increases the likelihood
of indeterminacy.  is strictly decreasing in the index of price stickiness  because  =
(1 )(1 )

. Therefore, as price stickiness decreases,  will increase. Intuitively, if there is no
price stickiness, there will be no frictions in the economy and the result will be similar to that
obtained from a classical monetary model. That is, monetary policy will not a¤ect output
and therefore when  < 1 a central bank cannot induce determinacy by responding strongly
to the output gap. However, for the purposes of examining the impact of incorporating asset
price deviations in the monetary policy rule on determinacy and assuming there exists some
degree of price stickiness, the qualitative implications of the results remain the same regardless
of the values chosen for  and .
34
The region consistent with determinacy is very similar to the one
obtained using the system from Bullard andMitra (2002). The small
di¤erence in the slopes can, in the most part, be attributed to the
inclusion of entrepreneurial consumption, the nancial accelerator
and capital.
However, incorporating a nancial accelerator e¤ect actually in-
creases the likelihood of indeterminacy (equivalent to an increase
in the slope) which cannot be observed in Figure 2 because of the
other e¤ects working in the opposite direction. This is supported by
robustness tests which show that the slope increases as the value of
 is increased from equation 3.26 (which acts to increase the nan-
cial accelerator e¤ect because the external nance premium is more
sensitive to entrepreneursnet worth relative to the gross value of
capital). This is also consistent with the results in Hirose (2008).21
Therefore, entrepreneurial consumption and capital are responsi-
ble for the decrease in the slope. If the role of capital in production
is reduced22 and entrepreneurial consumption is eliminated,23 the
slope becomes closer to the result in Bullard and Mitra (2002). If
capitals contribution to output is reduced via the elasticity para-
meter , the slope increases. The same is true for a reduction in
entrepreneurial consumption.
21Hirose (2008) uses the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) model to investigate the
sources of asset price uctuations in Japan. In doing so he obtains the parameter space
consistent with determinacy for  and the monetary policy coe¢ cient on ination. When
the external nance premium is highly elastic with respect to leverage, the economy always
exhibits indeterminacy regardless of how aggressively monetary policy responds to ination.
22 It has been observed in the literature that incorporating capital has a small e¤ect on
determinacy for contemporaneous monetary policy rules (Carlstrom and Fuerst 2005; Du¤y
and Xiao 2008).
23This can be done by removing the entrepreneurial consumption from the resource con-
straint, equation 3.24.
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4.3 Asset prices in the monetary policy rule
This section examines whether a central bank can a¤ect equilibrium
determinacy by reacting to asset prices. Figure 3 is the determinacy
region consistent with a monetary policy rule where the central bank
reacts to deviations in ination and asset prices from their steady
state values (y = 0).
fp
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Figure 3: Determinacy region for a response to asset prices when y = 0
Figure 3 shows that a central bank can respond to deviations in
asset prices without inducing additional volatility. In other words,
the ndings of this thesis suggest that following a monetary pol-
icy rule which incorporates asset price deviations can do no harm.
Moreover, the trade-o¤ at the boundary of the determinacy region
can be exploited to the extent that values of  < 1 can still lead to
determinacy when there is a response to asset prices.
Similar to the trade-o¤ between responding to the output gap
and ination deviations, the trade-o¤ between responding to as-
set price and ination deviations is not one-for-one because of the
relationship between ination and asset price deviations implied by
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the New Keynesian Phillips Curve.24 This substitutability between
responding to ination and asset price deviations is consistent with
Bernanke and Gertlers (1999) view that a strong commitment to
stabilising ination renders a response to asset prices unnecessary.
The question of importance is then what is driving this substi-
tutability in the model. Suppose there is an increase in fundamen-
tal asset prices. This improves entrepreneursbalance sheets, which
reduces the cost of external funds and thereby increases investment
and stimulates aggregate demand, leading to further increases in
asset prices. This increase in aggregate demand also drives up the
price level, fuelling ination at the same time. Therefore, in a way,
responding directly to asset prices is similar to responding more
aggressively to ination.
Figure 4 shows how the determinacy region changes as the weight
on the output gap coe¢ cient y is increased.
24 It is di¢ cult to show this algebraically without an analytical condition for determinacy.
Using the expression for marginal cost from the labour equilibrium equation, the New Keyne-
sian Phillips Curve can be expressed as: t = [

1  (yt zt kt)+ct yt]+Ett+1. Where
yt =
C
Y
ct +
Ce
Y
cet +
I
Y
it +
G
Y
gt. Asset price deviations a¤ect entrepreneurial consumption,
investment and capital which in turn a¤ect ination via the above expression for the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve.
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a: y = 0:5
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b: y = 1
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c: y = 2
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d: y = 4
Figure 4: The determinacy region as the weight on the output gap coe¢ cient is
increased
The substitutability between  and q becomes increasing di¢ -
cult to exploit (see bottom panels c and d in Figure 4). The intu-
ition is that as the central bank increases the weight on the output
gap, when  < 1 the additional gain from responding to asset price
deviations declines because both responding to the output gap and
asset price deviations are in e¤ect di¤erent ways to respond to
inationary pressures in this model.
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When the central bank is increasing the weight on the output
gap coe¢ cient, it cannot further exploit the substitutability between
responding to ination and asset price deviations by increasing the
weight on q.
4.4 Implications for the conduct of monetary policy
Given the substitutability between responding to deviations in as-
set prices and ination, the underlying question of importance is
whether this can be exploited. Figure 5 shows how the
determinacy region changes as the weight on the asset price
coe¢ cient, q is increased.
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a: q = 1
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b: q = 2
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c: q = 4
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d: q = 8
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e: q = 20
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f: q = 40
Figure 5: The determinacy region as the weight on the asset price coe¢ cient q is
increased
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Figure 5 shows that indeterminacy becomes less likely when the
central bank reacts to asset price deviations. As the value of q
increases, the determinacy region becomes more determinate, and
the Taylor principle when y = 0 no longer holds. The cases where
q = 20 and y = 40 (panels e and f) have been included purely for
illustrative purposes as such weights are clearly unrealistic.
However, Figure 5 shows that the substitutability between re-
sponding to deviations in asset prices and ination can only be ex-
ploited when the coe¢ cient on the output gap is small. This is con-
sistent with the reasoning that increasing the weight of the output
gap coe¢ cient diminishes the gain from responding to deviations in
asset prices from a determinacy perspective, as seen in Figure 4.
The key implication of the preceding results for the conduct
of monetary policy is that if a central bank elects to respond to
asset prices it can do so without inducing additional volatility. This
contrasts the results in Bullard and Schaling (2002) and Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2007) where the opposite is found. The di¤erence in the
results can be attributed to the nancial accelerator in the model
used here which drives the substitutability between responding to
asset prices and ination.
In Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007), an increase in ination is asso-
ciated with a decline in rm prots and, as a result, share prices.
Therefore, ination and share prices move in opposite directions
which means the overall response to ination is weaker when a
central bank responds to share prices. Similarly, in Bullard and
Schaling (2002), the central banks responses to deviations in in-
ation and equity prices move in opposite directions because any
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increase in the equity price coe¢ cient is associated with a decrease
in the coe¢ cients on ination and the output gap and thus increases
the likelihood of indeterminacy.
The conclusion in this thesis that a central bank will not nec-
essarily induce volatility in the economy by adopting a policy rule
which responds to deviations in asset prices also contrasts the view
of Bernanke and Gertler (1999). The conclusion is more in line
with that of Cecchetti et al. (2000). However, the results in this
thesis are a di¤erent vantage point from which to answer the ques-
tion of whether central banks should respond to asset prices. From
the perspective of equilibrium determinacy for a New Keynesian
model with a nancial accelerator, not only do such monetary policy
rules cause no harm, they can also make indeterminacy less likely.
4.5 A model with non-fundamental asset price
uctuations
The question of whether central banks should respond to asset prices
has been, in part, motivated by the adverse macroeconomic e¤ects
of asset price bubbles. As previously noted, the Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999) model allows only fundamental factors to a¤ect
asset prices. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) extend this model to allow
non-fundamental factors to a¤ect asset prices by allowing the market
value of an asset (st) to di¤er from the assets fundamental value (qt).
Consequently, the market value of an asset now determines entre-
preneurial consumption and the balance sheets of rms such that:
cet = st + kt+1 (4.1)
Etr
s
t+1 = rt    (nt   st   kt+1) (4.2)
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Equations 4.1 and 4.2 replace equations 3.24 and 3.26 respec-
tively. The returns to assets and capital are now determined by the
following equations:
st   qt = (1  )
bRq
Et(st+1   qt+1) (4.3)
rqt = (1  #)(mct + yt   kt) + #qt   qt 1 (4.4)
rst = (1  #)(mct + yt   kt) + #st   st 1 (4.5)
Etr
s
t+1 = Etr
q
t+1   (1  b)(st   qt) (4.6)
rnt = t + yyt + sst (4.7)
where b = a(1  ) and a governs the rate at which the bubble con-
verges to zero over time. In accordance with Bernanke and Gertler
(1999), a = 0:98 which means that the bubble is arbitrarily close to
a rational bubbleas described in Blanchard and Watson (1982).25
Equation 4.3 gives the expected evolution of the bubble. The fun-
damental return to assets (4.4) remains the same as in equation
3.25. Equation 4.5 captures the non-fundamental return on assets
(given by the sum of the current market return to assets and any
increase in the market value of assets). According to equation 4.6,
the expected market return and the fundamental return depend on
the presence of the bubble. Finally, from equation 4.7 the nominal
interest rate responds to the market value of an asset rather than the
fundamental value. The details of the dynamic system are provided
in Appendix B.
This thesis nds that incorporating an asset price bubble of the
specications in Bernanke and Gertler (1999), has no impact on
25 In broad terms, a rational bubble is a bubble that is consistent with the rational behaviour
of agents.
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equilibrium determinacy. This is consistent with Hirose (2008) who
argues that the non-fundamental asset price uctuations studied in
the literature such as in Bernanke and Gertler (1999) incorporate
the bubble only as an exogenous shock, and this does not represent
agentsbeliefs in a formal and explicit way. Moreover, the nan-
cial accelerator mechanism remains the same regardless of whether
there is a fundamental or non-fundamental change in asset prices.
For these reasons, the conditions for determinacy of equilibrium are
una¤ected by adding in an asset price bubble of this type. The
relevant gures have been provided in Appendix C.
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5 Conclusion
The main nding of this thesis is that responding to asset prices im-
pacts the determinacy conditions of a New Keynesian model with a
nancial accelerator. The results suggest that, by following a mon-
etary policy rule which incorporates deviations in asset prices, a
central bank will not induce additional volatility. In fact, respond-
ing to deviations in asset prices makes indeterminacy less likely.
Central banks that are strict ination targeters (for example, the
Reserve Bank of Australia) and central banks that appear to target
both ination and the output gap (for example, the United States
Federal Reserve) can potentially lower macroeconomic instability by
reacting to asset prices.
It should be noted that the specications of the model could
potentially have some impact on the conditions for equilibrium de-
terminacy. For this reason further research needs to be done on
the determinacy conditions when a central bank responds to devi-
ations in asset prices in other types of monetary policy rules. As
pointed out by McCallum (1999), policy rules which react only to
information observed in the current period are unrealistic given the
information set available to policy-makers when they set the nom-
inal interest rate. Consequently, further study on the determinacy
conditions for policy rules which respond to current expectations,
lagged values and future forecasts of the output gap and ination
and asset price deviations could be benecial.
While the results in this thesis also indicate that it makes no
di¤erence whether asset prices change due to fundamental or non-
fundamental factors from a determinacy condition perspective, this
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is due to the way in which non-fundamental asset price bubbles
have been incorporated into general equilibrium models. This result
would not be expected to hold once the non-fundamental component
of asset prices is endogenised.
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A Method of decomposition
Following the Schur Decomposition, assume there exists square
matrices G and H and some upper triangular matrices  and 

such that:
GD1 = H
0 (A.1)
GD2 = 
H
0 (A.2)
where GG0 = G0G = I and HH 0 = H 0H = I are unitary matrices.
D1
264 Pt
Xt
375 = D2
264 Pt+1
Xt+1
375+ E
264 Ut+1
t+1
375 (A.3)
To obtain the eigenvalues for the system the error vector can be
omitted. Multiplying both sides by G yields:
GD1
264 Pt
Xt
375 = GD2
264 Pt+1
Xt+1
375 (A.4)
Using A.1 and A.2:
H 0
264 Pt
Xt
375 = 
H 0
264 Pt+1
Xt+1
375 (A.5)
This can then be expressed as:

264 Vt
Wt
375 = 

264 Vt+1
Wt+1
375 (A.6)
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where 264 Vt
Wt
375 = H 0
264 Pt
Xt
375 (A.7)
The diagonal entries of  1
 are the eigenvalues for the system
such that:
 1
 =
0B@ 11 12
0 22
1CA
 10B@ !11 !12
0 !22
1CA (A.8)
where  1
 is an upper triangular matrix. Therefore, the
eigenvalues are given by !ii=ii.
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B System incorporating non-fundamental asset
price uctuations
The system for a model where an asset price bubble can be driven
by non-fundamentals is very similar to the system when there are
only fundamental changes in asset prices. The key di¤erence is that
st and rst are added as free variables and st 1 and Et 1rst are added
as predetermined variables (and Et 1rqt is no longer a predetermined
variable). The dynamic system from above has been reproduced
with the additional variables for convenience:
B11Pt = B12EtPt+1 +B13Xt (B.1)
Xt = RPt 1 + SXt 1 + Ut (B.2)
Where Pt = [ct; it; t; rqt ; qt; st; rst ] is a vector of free variables,
Xt = [kt; nt 1; gt; zt; qt 1; st 1; Et 1rst ] is a vector of predetermined vari-
ables, Ut = [0; 0; "gt ; "zt ; 0; 0; 0] is a vector of fundamental disturbances
and R and S are conformable matrices.
The matrices can then be redened such that:
Pt = B1EtPt+1 + CXt (B.3)
Xt = RPt 1 + SXt 1 + Ut (B.4)
where B1 = (B11) 1B12 and C = (B11) 1B13.
Letting t+1 = Pt+1  EtPt+1, the system can then be rewritten as:
Pt = B1Pt+1 + CXt  B1t+1 (B.5)
Xt+1 = RPt + SXt + Ut+1 (B.6)
52
The dynamic system is then written as a vector autoregressive
process:
D1
264 Pt
Xt
375 = D2
264 Pt+1
Xt+1
375+ E
264 Ut+1
t+1
375 (B.7)
where
D1 =
264 I  C
R S
375 (B.8)
D2 =
264 B1 0
0 I
375 ( B.9)
E =
264 0  B1
 I 0
375 (B.10)
The method of decomposition remains the same.
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C Figures for non-fundamental asset price
uctuations
The determinacy regions when non-fundamental factors can drive
changes in asset prices are shown in Figures C.1 and C.2. The
determinacy regions when only fundamental factors a¤ect asset prices
have also been included as a point of comparison.
fp
fy
fp
fy
a: Fundamental uctuations and q = 0 b: Non-fundamental uctuations and s = 0
Figure C.1: The determinacy regions when a central bank does not respond to
asset price deviations
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fq
fp
fs
a: Fundamental uctuations and y = 0 b: Non-fundamental uctuations and y = 0
Figure C.2: The determinacy region when a central bank responds to asset price
deviations
The determinacy regions are identical, which indicates that there
is no e¤ect on determinacy from incorporating an asset price bubble
of the type in Bernanke and Gertler (1999). If lagged asset prices are
incorporated into the policy rule instead of contemporaneous asset
prices as in Bernanke and Gertler (1999), as expected, this slightly
increases the likelihood of indeterminacy. However, it does so for
both models.
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